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China And Russia Walk Into A Room.

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There was quite a lot of media coverage of President Putin’s visit to China earlier this month. Since I’m not an expert on Russia or China (and have never visited either country) I’m going to abstain from amateur geopolitical analysis of the visit and what it means, and focus on something a little more precise where I do have a certain amount of experience: the Joint Declaration that was signed at the end of the visit.

I’m doing this because there has been very little commentary on the Declaration itself: most media coverage has simply repeated what was in the English version of the concluding remarks  by the two Presidents, in the English translation put out by the Kremlin. As of the time of writing, I haven’t been able to find an English-language translation of the Declaration itself on any official site (if anybody has, please provide a link in Comments) so I have used the official Russian text as published on the Kremlin site, and run it through an automatic translation program. This has obvious limitations which I’ll discuss in a moment, but it gives a good general idea of the contents, and can be supplemented with the approved English translation of the concluding remarks, which I’ll say a brief word about at the end. (The language of diplomacy is sufficiently particular and formalised that it’s often possible to judge whether a translation is accurate or not.)

Let’s start with the basics. When two or more important political leaders meet, there is generally some kind of joint public statement to commemorate it, and to put the best interpretation on relations between the two countries. These statements can be called “communiqués,” “joint statements", “joint declarations” and many other things: the label isn’t really important. Sometimes these statements are very brief and banal, but they can be interesting as indications that things have happened at all (eg the Bahrainis in Moscow recently.) Obviously, these statements are not written by the leaders concerned: they will have been drafted by the respective staffs and then signed off by the principals, in the weeks or months before the meeting.

There’s a reasonably standard template for this: leaders (or Ministers of something) of A and B met in country C on date D. They noted with satisfaction the increasing closeness between their countries, they exchanged views on X, Y and Z, agreed various plans for cooperation and decided to meet again soon. The more important the countries, the more important the issues and the greater the number of players, the longer this all takes and the longer the document tends to be. NATO and EU Summits are typically great consumers of time and energy. The 2023 NATO Summit Communiqué, for example, runs to 90 paragraphs, and would have taken months of work in Brussels and in capitals, beginning with a draft by the NATO International Staff. So one way of judging how things are going is by looking at the length of the text: a short text after a major meeting is almost infallibly a sign that there were issues where it wasn’t possible to find a common position. Sometimes, though, what stands out from even a long text is the absence of something you might have expected, and that itself can be important: I’ll give an example from the Russia-China declaration in a moment.

When you are analysing a text in a language you speak, it’s often interesting to look very carefully at the choice of individual words. For example, there’s a lot of difference between “agreed to cooperate on X,” “agreed to explore the possibility of cooperation on X,” and “recognised that cooperation on X could/would/might be to their mutual benefit.” In such cases, you have to engage in what literary critics call “close reading” of texts, paying attention to every nuance. (If there’s interest, I may try that with a text in English on future occasion.) Here, that’s not really possible, but we can, nonetheless reach some interesting conclusions on the text, assuming it broadly reflects the intent of the two nations.

Let’s start with the title; never a bad idea. The (translated) title is:

“Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on deepening relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation entering a new era in the context of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.”

This tells us a couple of things straight away. Firstly, it’s not a simple communiqué by two leaders after a meeting. The governments, not the current leaders, are the notional authors of the text. Thus, it is intended as a working document for the future, perhaps even after the two leaders have left the scene, rather than a statement of where the countries are now. The title already indicates that a program of work for the future has been agreed. Secondly, it’s put in a very particular and symbolic historical context. Seventy-five years ago is 1949, and the end of the Civil War in China. Thus, the title makes explicit reference to the beginning of the period when the Communist Party took power in China, and when it was still ruling Russia. This will be picked up later in the declaration, in the references to countries finding their own ways politically. For Russia, in particular, this Declaration is put in the context of the history of the Soviet Union, without any sense of defensiveness. Finally, the “new era” referred to in the title suggests that in the text we will find some judgements about the current state of the world and how it has changed, and also some initiatives to take account of those changes, and indeed we do. The reference to “strategic cooperation” in the title (assuming the translation is accurate) is interesting as well, and suggests cooperation on major issues of world politics, which indeed turns out to be the case.

It’s normal in such texts to invoke long and friendly relations, and to gloss over points of difficulty. So here it’s stated that bilateral relationships since 1949 “have come a long and sometimes difficult path,” which is putting it mildly, but it’s a standard rule in such texts that you don’t wash any more dirty linen in public than you have to.

Then, there’s the nature of the text itself. At 9000 words, it’s extremely long for a bilateral declaration and, as we’ll see, goes into considerable detail. It covers, for example, not just security, political and defence issues (indeed they occupy a relatively small proportion of the text) but also political contacts (parliaments etc.), law enforcement, responses to emergencies, energy (including nuclear power), agriculture, transport, customs issues, Intellectual Property and competition policy, education and cultural issues, healthcare and disease prevention, tourism, media, counter-terrorism, climate change, and other issues.

Consider for a moment that few Chinese decision-makers speak Russian and vice versa. This is a relatively common occurrence with multinational texts, and it’s not unusual for the two (or more) nations to use a common language, often English or French. On this occasion it’s hard to say, but in practice the two partners would probably worked in their own languages, and made a lot of use of interpreters and translators, and it’s quite likely that there were two texts circulating at the same time, one in each language. If not carefully handled, this can cause enormous confusion. As often in a long text, there are numbered sections and the text itself is modular, so almost certainly the two partners would have taken responsibility for first drafts of different parts of the text, and working groups would then have gone over the detail. Anything else is impossible.

The first step would have been to agree what the Declaration itself was going to cover, and which subjects would be included and how. The two countries would discuss lists of topics, and probably either set up some specialist  groups, or a special drafting group, reinforced as needed with experts. After the preamble, which just sets the scene, the first section sets out the broad political context and gives an indication of the content. This section (sometimes called the chapeau from the French for “hat,”) was probably the first to be drafted, by the personal staffs of the two leaders, and would have been agreed by them personally before work started on the rest of the text.

I mentioned earlier that it’s interesting to see what’s not included, since, like an iceberg, every agreed international text has a negotiating history behind it, full of alternative drafts, different versions of parts of the text and arguments about what to say, and how to say it. Given that virtually every other part of the world is at least name-checked, it’s curious that there is no mention of Europe at all. Now some have interpreted this as a deliberate snub, but I suspect the truth is simpler. The Russians would have wanted a robust statement in support of their own policies towards Europe, whereas the Chinese would have been much more reluctant. At quite an early stage the two leaders would have had to consider whether the subject was worth arguing about, and probably decided it wasn’t. That said, in the references to Ukraine and to western misdeeds generally, it’s clear that Europe is included by association. But even if there had been a paragraph or two about Europe, it would have been lost in the larger text: we are a very long way from Gorbachev and his “Common European Home” of thirty-five years ago.

Now, in spite of that omission, the text is very comprehensive, and there are very few other obvious lacunae. Just consider, then, how much work that must have taken, and how much time and effort of senior decision-makers. The Russians in particular have other issues of concern at the moment, and one of the many subliminal messages that comes out of the text is that in fact Ukraine is not the only priority for Russia. Rather, Moscow has been prepared to invest probably months of work in this declaration and all the negotiations that preceded it, including arrangements for the visit, and to agree with the Chinese all kinds of initiatives and common positions on global issues. Ukraine gets a mention, as we shall see, but not an unduly large one.

So let’s look at the text, always bearing in mind that this is an automatic translation and we should not pursue nuances too far. The first part stresses the innovative nature of the Russian-Chinese partnership, as a more “advanced” form of cooperation between states, compared to Cold War alliances (including implicitly therefore the Warsaw Pact) and not of a confrontational nature, ie not directed “against” any other nation. (In practice, the text later all-but-identifies the United States as an enemy, but does not formally say so.) The next point is that these relations (which, it has been stressed, already have a 75-year history) are for the long term, and the mutual interests of the countries and their peoples. There’s then an interesting point about sovereignty (again beware of machine translations):

“The parties are determined to defend their legitimate rights and interests, to oppose any attempts to prevent the normal development of bilateral relations, to interfere in the internal affairs of the two states, to limit the economic, technological or foreign policy potential of Russia and China.”

This is a fairly blunt message to the West, and seems to cover things like sanctions against China, attempts to force the Chinese to join western pressure and sanctions against Russia, activities of the media and NGOs in the two countries, and western attempts to oppose increasing Chinese and Russian moves into parts of the world the West has historically dominated. They then put themselves and their relationship forward as an “model of relations” to the rest of the world, based as it is on the UN Charter and respect for international law. Here, inevitably, the focus is on the Global South, and the strong subliminal message is that China and Russia are more virtuous and worthy of emulation than the West, and especially the US.

There are then a few paragraphs of mutual back-scratching, which is normal in such texts. The Chinese welcome Putin’s re-election in March, and condemn in very strong terms the “organisers, perpetrators and accomplices” of the terrorist attack in Moscow on 22 March. That formulation is carefully chosen (probably suggested by the Russians) and it points the finger unmistakably at Ukraine and the West, in line with allegations coming from Moscow after the attack. And there’s a later reference to Chinese support for Russian sovereignty and resistance to outside interference.

Of course, the Chinese want something in exchange, so they get a firm statement of support for the “One China” principle, opposition to Taiwanese independence, and support for Beijing’s efforts to “unite the country,” ie bring Taiwan back under Chinese rule. It’s doubtful whether the Russians care much either way about this question, but it’s important to the Chinese, and is the counterpart of their public support for Russia.

There’s then a long paragraph on recent changes in the world economic and political system, and “the democratisation of international relations and international justice.” This is contrasted with condemnation of old-fashioned thinking by states who have “the logic of hegemonism” and use force to replace the “universally recognised world order based on international law” with, you’ve guessed it, a “rules based order.” So it’s a relatively unsubtle poke at the West and especially the US, and a flag waved at the Global South. Interestingly, this language is associated in the text with Chinese, rather than Russian initiatives.

This line of thinking is then continued, with a strong statement about the respect for national sovereignty and the freedom of states to choose their own systems. There’s also a crack at “unilateral sanctions, not agreed by the Security Council.”  Although there’s nothing in international law or practice to support the idea, some commentators in the West have argued that sanctions not approved by the Security Council are illegal. These arguments stopped abruptly when sanctions against Israel became a real possibility last year, but from the Russian and Chinese perspective, since neither has expressed much interest in the Gaza crisis, it’s a logical and useful argument to repeat here.

Finally, there’s an interesting paragraph (no doubt proposed by Russia) which condemns attempts to “distort” the history of the Second World War and “glorify Nazism and militarism.” The two parties intend to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the War in style, and the Chinese have tacked on the idea of celebrating the victory of Chinese “resistance to Japanese aggression” at the same time.

This is a long and complex chapeau, and gives some idea of the range and complexity of what follows. It presents a picture of two virtuous and internationally-minded states who both fall back on the trusted mechanisms of international relations and international law, but are equally ready to cope with the complexities of a new multipolar world. The unnamed but very obvious villain in all this is the United States, tearing up the rules and interfering in the affairs of other states. It’s particularly interesting that the two nations are not proposing any new structures or rules themselves, but rather expressing a wish to return to the previous situation where, they argue, the rules were respected. (Whether there was any such period is open to debate, but the argument is bound to resonate with the Global South.)

We then go on to more detailed descriptions of cooperation and the reasons for it. The next section is largely about strategic and defence issues. All sorts of new joint bodies will be set up. The two nations want to develop defence cooperation, through joint exercises and operational training, and joint maritime and air patrols, arguing that this enhanced cooperation will strengthen “regional and global security.” So don’t imagine, Oh West, it says, that you can drive a wedge between us here. Likewise, the two countries will cooperate on law-enforcement, counter-terrorism and transnational organised crime, both together, and through the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. This is probably more significant than it may sound, since the two countries are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, and dominate the SCO and BRICS.

Equally, though, they condemn attempts to use the law as a weapon to interfere in the sovereign affairs of states, and the “politicisation” of international criminal justice (we know what that means) and defend the immunity of state reserves and property (and we know what that means, too.) Finally, there’s some language about cooperation in such areas as disaster relief, emergency response and even occupational safety. Joint exercises and training are foreseen.

That’s the end of Part II. The next section (Part III) is essentially devoted to economic and trade issues, and is extremely long and detailed: indeed, in many ways it’s the centre of the whole Declaration. In fact, it’s hard to think of much it doesn’t cover, from investment cooperation to energy security, from banking and insurance regulation to combating money laundering, from cooperation in all areas of technology to increasing agricultural trade, from improving transport links to promote cargo transport along the Northern Sea Route, to environmental protection to educational exchanges and cooperation, from culture to the One Belt One Road initiative.

Part IV is about ties between peoples, and features educational and cultural initiatives, cultural exchanges, initiatives to teach each others’ languages and scientific and technical exchanges, especially to work on climate change., as well as cultural festivals and popular song contests. However, beyond this relatively banal list is a serious political point, the “recognition of cultural and civilisational diversity” in a “multipolar world,” which probably means both resisting the encroachment of western popular culture, and fostering appreciation of their own cultures abroad. There’s a condemnation of attempts to “abolish the culture” of other countries, aimed fairly clearly at the West, as presumably are accusations of the “politicisation of the cultural sphere,“which, it has to be said, China and Russia have both practised extensively. Curiously, for an officially atheist state, China was ready to associate itself with what was obviously a Russian-drafted paragraph condemning the dismantlement and desecration of religious objects and monuments, and promoting “traditional spiritual and moral values.”

Part V is about the formation of a “more just and sustainable multipolar world order,” nodding to the UN Charter, and the Group of Friends of that charter, which they dominate. It calls for bilateral cooperation in UN organisations including the Security Council, multilateral cooperation in the fields of human rights, and most importantly resisting the “politicisation” of the human rights agenda as a way of interfering in the affairs of sovereign states. Similar things are said about the WHO and the WTO. Throughout this section, the Declaration presents the two countries as concerned to restore the original purity of UN and other multilateral organisations, and to preserve them from the political manipulation that they charge the West with.

There’s then a long section (VI) on multilateral economic cooperation, beginning with words of praise for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as the basis of a new multipolar world order. The future of the SCO is presented ambitiously, cooperating in politics, security, economics and human contacts, aimed at turning Eurasia into “a common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity.” There are then sections on BRICS, including the use of national currencies for trade, on UNESCO and the G20, as well as APEC. There is Russian praise for the Chinese-sponsored Global Development Initiative, as might be expected in a bilateral document of this kind.

The section on international security (VII) is the longest and probably most important. It amounts to a fairly heterogeneous list; one which shows signs of having been stitched together from the contributions of the two sides. Again, that’s quite normal.

It begins by expressing concerns about an “increase in conflict” both regionally and globally (which may raise eyebrows) and the risk of great-power confrontation, before running through a list of more specific issues. There is a supportive reference to the Joint Statement of the five Nuclear Powers on the prevention of nuclear war, issued in January 2022, partly as the kind of feel-good filler that characterises texts like this, but mostly, I suspect, a dig at some of the wilder statements that have been coming out of the US recently. In this context, the two states urge their three partners not to “encroach on each others’ vital interests,” especially through military alliances and coalitions and the deployment of nuclear weapons near each others’ borders ( a fairly transparent dig at the United States.) There’s then a supportive reference to the NPT (since it is in the interests of Russia and China to keep the number of nuclear powers to a minimum) but also opposition to its use “for political purposes not related to its subject matter.”

And just in case the reference isn’t clear enough, the text (presumably a Russian contribution) goes on to accuse the United States by name of attempts to violate the strategic balance by attempts to create a “global missile defence system.” There’s then a curious reference (unless it’s a translation error) to the danger of the use of “high-precision non-nuclear weapons” to launch “disarming” and “decapitating” first strikes. So far as I’m aware, NATO does not have such weapons; only Russia has them, so the reference is a bit obscure. There’s then a complaint (probably inserted by the Chinese side) about the AUS/US/UK submarine initiative, making the (rather strained) charge that the infrastructure for such submarines could theoretically be used to harbour US or British SSBNs, capable, presumably, of attacking China. (Though these SSBNs can already hit China from many other places in the world.) There are also accusations of plans by the US to deploy (presumably nuclear) missiles around the world, which will have the effect of threatening Russia and China.

There’s then a brief reference to the Biological and Toxins Weapon Convention and a demand for the introduction of a verification mechanism, which, of course the US has refused to contemplate. (It’s not obvious that Russia or China would accept it either, but the US has made itself an exposed target in this area.) There’s then a dig at the US for allegedly carrying out BW weapon research “outside their national territory” (ie including Ukraine): something the Russians made much of a couple of years ago, but haven’t mentioned much recently. This is followed by a statement of opposition to the militarisation of outer space, and a reference (normal in texts like this) to the Russo-Chinese joint proposals for a draft treaty.

There’s then a section on the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which they accuse various forces (evidently the West) of “politicising.” Presumably at Chinese instigation, there is a reference to the enormous (and massively expensive) Japanese operation to clean up chemical weapons abandoned in Manchuria, which has been going on since the late 1990s, and which has provided China not only with a source of income but with opportunities it does not neglect to make political capital out of the slow progress of the project.

This is followed by a statement of support for the idea of export controls on sensitive technologies, but also the accusation that these controls also have been “politicised.” As among the main targets of such initiatives, the two countries again present themselves as wanting to return to the original purpose of the various export control regimes, and rescue them from western political interference.

The next subject is terrorism and extremism, which is a common problem for the two states: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement is name-checked here, presumably as a quid pro quo for the earlier Chinese condemnation of the recent Moscow attacks. There follows a statement about the need to cooperate on transnational organised crime, as well as drug trafficking.

There’s a surprisingly long, and generally positive section on Artificial Intelligence and  Information and Communications Technology, including another piece of obligatory mutual back-scratching:

“The Russian Side welcomes the Chinese Initiative for Global Governance in Artificial Intelligence, the Chinese Party welcomes the nomination by the Russian Party of the ethical principles of artificial intelligence, enshrined in the Russian Code of Ethics in the field of artificial intelligence.”

Even here, though, there’s a passing swipe at the “monopolisation of technologies” and measures to stop the development of AI in various states.

Section VIII is a short section about Climate Change and, among mainly banal sentiments, it aims a passing blow at the “creation of barriers to international trade under the pretext of combating climate change” as well as a stern reproof to Japan for the Fukushima leak.

Section IX is devoted to Ukraine, and must have been difficult to draft. The solution is for Russia to propose wording which China then does not demur from. So Russia thanks China for its “objective and unbiased” position on Ukraine and shares the position (presumably of China) that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of the UN Charter “in its entirety.” And Russia welcome China’s readiness to play “a constructive role” in the political and diplomatic settlement. Thus, the Chinese do not themselves express a view on the war itself. The two countries then “note” the need to do and to avoid various things. This is a weak formulation, and they could have said something like “stress” or”emphasise” or even “draw attention to,” so this section must have been difficult to draft as well. They “note” the need to avoid “prolongation of hostilities,” further escalation and the crisis moving into an “uncontrolled phase” as well as the importance of dialogue. This is a crack at the US and Europe, but not a direct one. Finally, the parties “believe” (a stronger formulation), that a sustainable settlement requires elimination of “root causes,” and adherence of “indivisibility of security” and to taking the legitimate interests of all countries into account. Altogether, probably less than  the Russians would have wanted, but as much as the Chinese were prepared to give.

The last section (X) is a long series of loosely-connected statements about broader security issues, probably the result of considerable horse-trading about content and form. There is a kind of mini-chapeau at the start, on the interrelationships of security, such that “no state should ensure its security” at the expense of others, and the need for a “sustainable security system in the Eurasian space.” The two countries call on countries and organisations (ie the US and NATO) to stop interfering in other states, and thus promoting regional tensions and confrontation.

There’s direct criticism of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region (presumably a Chinese suggestion), military alliances and coalitions and the “destructive” NATO involvement in the region. This includes “serious concern” about the US/UK/AUS submarine project. The Russians support the efforts of China and ASEAN “to jointly protect peace and stability” in the region, and to promote ASEAN’s security role.  There’s more direct criticism of “intimidation” by the US and its allies in Asia that might provoke a further confrontation with North Korea.

Interestingly, almost nothing is said about the Middle East, and nothing at all about the crisis in Gaza, apart from stock language about a just and lasting settlement on the basis of a two-state solution. This reflects the fact that China and Russia have not been very voluble on the subject, and appear to be taking a you-broke-it-you-fix it attitude, and letting the US stew. On the other hand there is a passing reference to “supporting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” of Syria and Libya, with the solution to come from “the citizens of these countries themselves.” In other words, a warning to western powers to keep out.

There’s then a section on Afghanistan, in which the two countries congratulate themselves on their involvement in the “Moscow Format” for settlement of the problem, with Iran, Pakistan, and the SCO. The West is not mentioned except being identified as the source of the country’s problems, and urged not to send further military forces.

Finally, there are some afterthought paragraphs, about the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and cooperation with Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. There’s a swipe at the West in the praise of the efforts of African countries “to solve problems by African methods.” There’s a brief reference to a demilitarised Arctic.

I’ve gone through the Declaration in some detail, partly because I don’t think anyone else has in English, and partly to give a sense of its sheer inclusiveness. There are also, however, two much shorter statements by the principals which do have authorised English translations, so I’ll just glance at them before summing up.

Xi, who as the host spoke first, talked about the relationships between the states as a “role model” for the rest of the world and the future, with a not-very-subtle rebuke to those pursuing alternative models. He distinguished five principles, which were (1) mutual respect and firm commitment on core issues (2) win-win approach to cooperation, especially in the economic area (3) benefitting from historic cultural ties (4) strategic cooperation on global governance and (5) going beyond Cold War mindsets and hegemonic desires to resolve international crises. Putin then followed, talking very largely about economic issues, trade and cooperation. Neither of the leaders said much about international politics and strategic issues: the idea was to end the visit with firm statements of mutual amity.

Now then, what can we take away from the Declaration? (As I said, I don’t claim to be an expert on the underlying subject-matter.) At least the following, I think.

I doubt whether there has ever been a larger and more ambitious set of orientations for the future, in just about every domain you can think of. Of course, not everything that is listed will be done: life’s like that. But this is the most ambitious shopping list I can ever remember two nations agreeing, and that is a political message in itself, irrespective of the content. This document has by any standards taken a massive amount of work.

In spite of the talk of “democratising” the international system, there is no suggestion that the system itself will change. No new organisations or procedures are being proposed; rather, what is being suggested is that existing arrangements have been corrupted and politicised, and that it is now time to return to some (unspecified) time in the past, when they worked better. Thus, the present system will continue, but Russia and China will have a larger collective influence in it. There’s no question, for example, of wider membership, let alone permanent membership, of the Security Council. In that sense, the Declaration is conservative, if not actually reactionary.

The audience for the Declaration is essentially outside the West: there’s no evidence, for example, that either Russia or China has sought special publicity for it in the West, which itself tells you something. Likewise, and further to the idea that silences are important, the text contains absolutely no overtures to the West, no suggestion that relations might improve, no suggestion that there are common interests to be served. The world will increasingly be, if not run then at least heavily influenced, by a condominium led by Russia and China in which the West will have no influence.

Finally, there’s the issue of the total silence on Europe. As I’ve said, this is less a deliberate snub, in my view, than a measure of the difficulty of finding common ground when the Chinese are somewhat more interested in relations with Europe than the Russians are. But it’s significant that the two sides evidently didn’t feel strongly enough about the issue to spend a lot of time on it, and, even had they managed a banal sentence or two, it would have been lost in the noise.

This, perhaps, is the final message to take away from the Declaration: the West is a nuisance, sometimes a dangerous one, but that’s all. The West is not a partner in any sense, just an obstacle to be circumvented and the exponent of an outdated model of hegemony. Now of course, words are (relatively) cheap, and I’m not qualified to say how far, and how quickly, the grand designs in the Declaration will actually be put into practice. But it’s interesting nonetheless that this is the first document I can ever remember where the message to the West was: we’re just not interested in you.