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E3 'snapback' may trigger Iranian nuclear double-down

The UK, France, and Germany have killed the Iran nuclear deal. Now, Tehran moves to escalate nuclear posture and sever ties with IAEA as western states intensify political warfare.

Zafar Mehdi

Less than a week after the European troika triggered the so-called “snapback” clause of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the mechanism within the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and US-led western powers that reimposes all UN sanctions on Iran within 30 days, the atmosphere in Tehran is one of steely resolve mixed with strategic recalibration.

Iranian officials and lawmakers say the European signatories, having defaulted on their JCPOA obligations after Washington's unilateral 2018 withdrawal, now lack any legal or moral authority to invoke the mechanism. But there is also growing public anger at those who brokered the accord, who had promised that no such clause could ever be activated.

Rewriting the ‘rules-based order’ 

France, Germany, and Britain (E3) initiated the “snapback” process on 28 August, claiming that Iran violated the terms of the nuclear deal. Tehran, however, maintains that it was the Europeans who failed to uphold the accord, buckling under US pressure.

“Today, Iran’s non-compliance with the JCPOA is clear and deliberate, and sites of major proliferation concern in Iran are outside of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] monitoring,” E3 stated in a letter to the UN Security Council, insisting that there is “no civilian justification” for the country’s “high enriched uranium stockpile.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi slammedthe move as “immoral, unjustified and unlawful,” noting that the European troika was “framing its reckless gambit as an endeavor to ‘advance diplomacy.’”

“The actions of the European troika effectively reward the offender and punish the victim.”

Under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, sanctions are automatically reimposed if any party alleges that Iran is in significant non-compliance. The mechanism cannot be vetoed, even by permanent UNSC members, meaning that China and Russia – Iran’s strategic Eurasian partnerswithin the multipolar bloc – have no legal power to prevent it from happening. 

The pre-deal UN sanctions primarily included a strict embargo on the sale or transfer of conventional weapons, limitations on ballistic missile development, asset freezes targeting individuals and entities linked to the country’s nuclear and missile programs, and a ban on the export of materials and technologies related to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities. 

In the July Geneva talks, European parties offered Iran a deal to delay the snapback: renewed negotiations with the US, unfettered access for UN inspectors to Iranian nuclear sites, and the destruction of over 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.

The offer, which came only weeks after the Israeli-American attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, was reportedly not entertained by the Iranian side, citing a lack of trust. 

Just two days before the snapback, the two sides convened again in Geneva. Afterward, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, stated that Tehran “remains committed to diplomacy and a mutually beneficial diplomatic solution.”

“High time for the E3 and UNSC to make the right choice, and give diplomacy time and space,” wrote Gharibabadi, a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team. 

Then on 28 July, the E3 formally notified the UN Security Council of its decision to initiate the snapback process, opening a 30-day window before the automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions.

Europe’s coercive case 

In a letter to the UN Security Council, the E3 outlined their rationale for triggering snapback, accusing Iran of exceeding JCPOA limits on enriched uranium, heavy water, and centrifuges; restricting the UN nuclear watchdog’s access to nuclear facilities; and halting the implementation and ratification of the Additional Protocol.

According to the E3, Iran’s failure to comply constitutes “significant non-performance,” justifying the activation of the snapback mechanism, while emphasizing that the 30-day window initiated by their notification does not preclude diplomacy. 

The 30-day period, starting 28 August, provides a structured period to engage Iran in diplomatic discussions, the E3 stated in the letter, and if no consensus is reached, six previously terminated UN resolutions, including sanctions, could be automatically reinstated.

Araghchi, in response, framed it as a politically motivated attempt to pressure the Iranian people and warned that Europe is rendering itself into a “permanently spent force.” 

Speaking in a phone call with EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas, Araghchi emphasized that Europe’s actions “make the pursuit of diplomacy more complicated” and could provoke an “appropriate response” from Tehran.

Amir Saeed Iravani, Iran’s UN envoy, echoed the top diplomat, labeling the move as “illegal, null and void” and a violation of Resolution 2231, while stressing that Europe’s actions distort reality, undermine international law, and exploit the Security Council for political purposes. 

Moscow's proposed six-month extension of Resolution 2231 appears unlikely to prevent the snapback mechanism from taking effect. Informed sources tell The Cradle that Tehran is unenthusiastic about the extension, and top security official Ali Larijani has already voiced his opposition. The nuclear dossier has now shifted from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by Larijani.

Snapback pressure vs Iranian resilience

Iranian officials say the snapback will not significantly impact its oil or financial sectors, but acknowledge its psychological warfare component.

Last week, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said that the country’s oil industry has expanded capacity by 127,000 barrels per day (bpd) and is capable of devising methods for marketing and selling oil under various restrictive conditions, including under UN sanctions. 

Allaedin Boroujerdi, a veteran lawmaker and member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, informs The Cradle that the current US and EU sanctions on Iran are “already far harsher” than pre-JCPOA UN resolutions, so the snapback “wouldn’t significantly change” the situation facing Iran. “The real goal of the E3 move to trigger snapback is to create economic and psychological pressure inside Iran in order to destabilize society and weaken public resolve,” he said, adding that the country remains united and resilient following the recent Israeli-American aggression and “will not retreat under foreign pressure.”

But senior lawmaker and economist Mohsen Zangeneh tells The Cradle that the six previously terminated resolutions are important as they prevent countries from engaging in financial cooperation with Iran and authorized inspections, controls, and even the seizure of Iranian ships and aircraft passing through their territories.

While acknowledging that these measures do have an impact, he says that given Iran’s experience under existing US sanctions, the impact of new sanctions on the Iranian economy is unlikely to be severe enough to cripple trade or halt oil exports.

Zangeneh, who also serves on the parliament’s planning and budget Committee, explains that Iran has developed various strategies to neutralize the effects of sanctions and will continue its commercial activities, though he acknowledged that the cost of such transactions will inevitably increase.

From a legal perspective, he points out that all UN sanctions fall under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits economic and communications restrictions but does not authorize military action, dismissing claims that a snapback could lead to international consensus for military measures against the Islamic Republic.

Nonetheless, he stresses that both the government and parliament must remain vigilant and prepare for all potential future scenarios.

Also speaking with The Cradle, Hossein Samsami, a senior Iranian lawmaker and member of the parliament’s economic commission, says the snapback mechanism carries two key effects – psychological and economic. 

“The psychological impact, particularly on currency markets, is immediate, as economic actors seize the moment to speculate. This effect outweighs the second, which relates to military and nuclear restrictions. Since Iran is largely self-sufficient in these areas, the direct pressure from such sanctions remains limited.” 

He cautions, however, that the reinstatement of UN sanctions could reinforce existing US and EU measures, making them harder to circumvent and driving up import costs. 

Tehran eyes NPT withdrawal

At the parliamentary level, a “triple-urgency” bill is currently under consideration, which could authorize Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Additional Protocol, ending all negotiations with the US and E3, and terminating supervisory cooperation with the UN nuclear agency. 

West Asia analyst Reza Sadr al-Hosseini tells The Cradle that Iran may scale back IAEA cooperation, expand centrifuge deployment, ramp up enrichment, and potentially commercialize enriched material. He confirms that the NPT withdrawal bill is under serious consideration as one of several retaliatory options. Such a move would signal Tehran's readiness to escalate if provoked, but also highlight the range of strategic tools at its disposal.

Calls to quit the NPT have been circulating for years, pushed by principalist lawmakers. Following Iran’s brief war with Israel in June and the IAEA’s silence over Tel Aviv's aggression, these calls from Iranians have grown louder. Lawmakers argue that IAEA oversight has failed to protect Iran’s nuclear infrastructure or elicit condemnation of Israeli-US strikes.

A formal exit from the NPT would mark a decisive rupture with the west and a turning point in Iran’s nuclear policy.

While parliament is unanimous, some reformists and former officials have cautioned against the move. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, a former reformist MP, has prioritized negotiations, with Araghchi reaffirming Iran's willingness to pursue a “fair” nuclear deal if the west shows “goodwill.”

Public opinion, however, leans in favor of exiting the NPT and ending one-way fair play, particularly after the 12-day war and widespread perceptions that the IAEA provided intelligence to the Israelis, either directly or indirectly.

The snapback mechanism, to Iran, is not a neutral legal instrument but part of a longstanding pattern of western double standards that rewards past violators while punishing the victim.

Araghchi, in his X post on Friday, reminded viewers that Iran engaged in five rounds of indirect nuclear talks with the Trump administration, with a sixth round interrupted by Israeli aggression. Yet, despite these provocations, Europe now accuses Iran of failing to negotiate in good faith.

Unsurprisingly, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar applauded the E3 move as “an important step” in countering Iranian nuclear ambitions, while the exiled son of the ousted Iranian shah, US-based Reza Pahlavi, described the action as a step toward “accountability.”

With the 30-day countdown underway, Tehran’s message is clear: It will not fold under pressure. The snapback may be the west’s latest gambit, but Iran is preparing for strategic escalation on multiple fronts.